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During the past decade, macroeconomic imbalances – typified by countries’ surplus or deficit of exports, currency, or capital – have moved to the fore of international 
economic policy debates. Global events and developments, such as China’s 
integration into the world economy, the 2008 financial crisis, and the Eurozone crisis, 
have created, and in some cases, compounded longstanding trade and investment 
asymmetries around the world. These imbalances have no single cause, but are fostered 
and magnified by the competitiveness of a country’s industries, domestic demand, 
corporate investment decisions, and tax and monetary policy, among other factors. In 
recent years, the widening gaps in countries’ trade relationships have become highly 
politicized, prompting policymakers to respond with measures ranging from formalized 
monitoring to punitive tariffs. 
The conditions that give way to macroeconomic imbalances are rather clear, but their 
broader, long-term consequences are the subject of contentious debate. While a country 
with an export surplus may generate revenue from its accumulated assets, for example, 
the decision to hold them in reserve comes at the expense of domestic investment. With 
a deficit, a country accumulates debt as it borrows from others to cover the costs of 
its imports, but its consequently depressed currency should ultimately make its exports 
more competitive on the global market. Macroeconomic theory tells us that these 
imbalances should not be permanent, as market forces such as demand and interest 
rates shape trade flows and adjust countries’ shares of exports, imports, currency, and 
capital. The world does not always operate according to theory, however; in practice, 
government policies and unique economic conditions at domestic, regional, and global 
levels perpetuate and expand macroeconomic imbalances. 
Perhaps the greatest of these is the wide gap between the current accounts of the 
United States and Germany. Although neither Germany’s $287 billion surplus nor 
the United States’ $124 billion deficit is the direct cause of the other, these current 
accounts represent the global poles of macroeconomic imbalances. German leaders 
attribute their country’s surplus primarily to the competitiveness of its manufacturing 
sector, domestic saving rates, and exogenous factors such as European monetary 
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policy and the value of the euro, the currency that Germany 
shares with 18 other member states of the European Union. 
U.S. policymakers, on the other hand, have been critical of 
Germany’s current account surplus for nearly two decades, 
and contend that Germans could reduce it – to the benefit of 
the Eurozone and the global economy – through domestic 
reforms and investment. American censure is now more 
pronounced than ever under President Donald Trump, who 
has characterized the U.S.-German economic relationship 
as unfair and has called on his counterparts to take concrete 
steps toward leveling the playing field. 
Germany’s Current Account Surplus – 
How Did We Get Here?
Germany has the largest current account surplus in the 
world, which in 2017 amounted to $287 billion, or 
approximately 7.8 percent of its total economic output.1  The 
country’s abundant supply of currency stocks is reflective 
of its overall economic state, with $1.4 trillion in exports in 
2017, a record-low unemployment rate below 4 percent in 
2018, and general public budget surpluses since 2014. 
Germany’s current account surplus has several sources, 
some of which are beyond its direct control and others that 
stem from longstanding business practices and government 
policy. First, the country enjoys several competitive 
advantages as an exporter, contributing to its positive 
trade balance that in turn makes up the larger part of its 
current account. The majority of its manufacturing base is 
in the so-called Mittelstand – nearly 4 million small and 
medium enterprises that employ the majority of the German 
workforce and produce goods that are highly competitive 
abroad for their quality and, in many cases, their degree 
of specialization. A number of government policies and 
practices, including broad support for apprenticeship 
programs and the provision of benefits that offset depressed 
wages, support this engine of Germany’s export-oriented 
economy. 
Current account surpluses tend to arise when domestic 
savings outpace investment. Such is the case in Germany’s 
highly industrialized economy, where income-rich 
households are prone to reach saturation points and 
therefore have a lower propensity for consumption. When 
German households (and companies, for that matter) 
have a sufficient amount of goods or capital, they tend 
to scale back purchasing in favor of saving additional 
income or resources. Furthermore, wage stagnancy in 
Germany compounds households’ penchant for saving. For 
several decades, firms and labor unions have collectively 
negotiated wage levels that are below what the market 
might otherwise dictate. Buttressed by a generous social 
welfare framework, German workers enjoy increased 
benefits in exchange for lower wages, and by extension, 
decreased spending power. Higher domestic spending – 
at both the government and household levels – would, in 
theory, diminish the country’s current account. Since wages 
generally remain constant though, household spending 
seems likely to increase only as a result of some other 
catalyst, such as a significant change in the German tax 
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code or a major cultural shift, neither of which is probable 
in the foreseeable future. 
Industrialized economies also tend to have large stocks of 
existing capital (machinery, production facilities, factory 
buildings, etc.) to power their industrial base, so demand 
for expansion of production capacities is relatively low. 
Germany has one of the lowest public investment rates in 
the industrialized world, in great part because federally 
controlled and private stocks continue to be viable. 
However, Germany’s municipalities, which are responsible 
for half of all public investment, currently have unrealized 
investment projects valued at €136 billion, or 4.5 percent 
of the country’s GDP.2 Despite low domestic demand for 
(or utilization of) capital, Germany generates a significant 
amount of it; the resulting oversupply keeps domestic prices 
– i.e. returns on investment – rather low, which incentivizes 
German capital holders to invest elsewhere. 
In short, savings are high in Germany, and demand for 
investment is low. Under these conditions, not all goods 
and services produced in Germany are consumed there 
as well, and consequently become available in the global 
real economy. Because of their high quality and associated 
price-performance ratio, these products remain in high 
demand in the rest of the world. Germany’s excess capital 
is exported to other countries – namely to those such as the 
United States, where investment demand and consumption 
are high and, as a result, imports are as well.
Another factor contributing to Germany’s large current 
account surplus is the country’s use of the euro. As a 
member of the Eurozone, Germany cannot directly control 
the value of its currency; the European Central Bank 
manages the bloc’s monetary policy, setting interest rates to 
control inflation for all 19 Eurozone member states. In 2014, 
the International Monetary Fund estimated that Germany’s 
inflation-adjusted exchange rate was undervalued by 
5-15 percent.3 With an economy significantly larger, more 
dynamic, and with greater production capacity than many 
of its neighbors, Germany effectively enjoys an export 
subsidy for its already competitive goods and services. 
The low price point relative to quality of German exports 
makes them more attractive abroad, fueling steady demand 
for production in excess of domestic consumption capacity. 
Another effect of Germany’s use of the euro on its current 
account balance is lower domestic purchasing power for 
imports. With a weaker currency, German households and 
firms can buy fewer goods and services from abroad. The 
country exports more than it imports, creating a persistent 
surplus in its trade balance, which in turn makes up the 
greater part of its current account. 
Germany’s current account surplus is the product of a 
combination of factors related to the country’s trade, 
investment, and saving practices. Many German political 
leaders and economists contend that the country’s surplus 
is beneficial not only for Germany, but for the world as a 
whole. As Gabriel Felbermayr, Clemens Fuest, and Timo 
Wollmershäuser of the Munich-based Ifo Institute for 
Economic Research point out, the net export of capital 
resulting from Germany’s current account surplus supplies 
the rest of the world with financial resources, which keeps 
global interest rates low and, in turn, facilitates investment in 
other parts of the world.4     
Stakeholders outside Germany tend to see its surplus in 
a less positive light, however. The European Commission 
and International Monetary Fund have, for several years, 
pressured the German government to stimulate domestic 
demand and increase imports to reduce its imbalance 
relative to other economies. Other Eurozone countries 
– particularly, but not limited to, those that have enacted 
austerity measures in the wake of the sovereign debt 
crisis – complain that the German surplus has a distortive 
effect beyond its borders, depressing demand for exports 
from other European countries and, by extension, raising 
unemployment and increasing their public debts. Across 
the Atlantic, U.S. President Donald Trump has decried 
transatlantic economic relations as unfavorable for the 
United States since his first days in office, aiming particular 
scorn at Germany and its current account and trade 
surpluses. 
Impact of the German Current Account 
Surplus on the Rest of the World
The question of whether Germany’s current account surplus 
is a problem is far from settled, and necessarily calls for 
specification: If it is a problem, for whom is it so? If one 
considers trade and current account surpluses and deficits 
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in relation to global economic activity, these imbalances are 
relatively minor. Germany’s current account surplus stands 
at just under 0.4 percent of global economic output, and 
therefore, as the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central 
Bank) points out, the risk of it reaching a crisis point is rather 
low.5   
Within the European Union, a highly integrated economic 
area and common currency make member states especially 
sensitive to one another’s imbalances and economic 
policies. A primary concern of the European Commission 
and several member states in regard to Germany’s surplus is 
not only its size, but its persistence. Just as Germany’s large 
volume of exports is directly associated with its high level 
of employment, countries in deficit have lower employment 
levels that might be improved through a reduction of their 
deficit relative to accounts in Germany. Southern Eurozone 
countries in particular, which are unable to improve their 
international competitiveness through currency devaluation, 
would expect to see higher employment and a reduction 
of public debt if their trade imbalance with Germany were 
decreased.
Italy, Spain, France, and Greece have consistently had 
unemployment rates around or above 10 percent since the 
onset of the global financial crisis. In the cases of Greece 
and Spain, those rates have even lingered around 25 
percent over the course of several years. These countries 
have expressed urgent need for more external demand to 
stimulate their economies, given that they cannot devalue 
their currency, and because austerity measures – often 
crafted and enforced by European creditors, including 
Germany, in the context of liquidity programs – have 
restricted other domestic stimulus programs. At the same 
time, Germany’s stagnant wages have effectively created 
Advantages Disadvantages
For Deficit 
Countries
Country produces more than it con-
sumes; level of employment is higher 
than if the country were to produce 
only what it needs.
Lower unemployment rate lightens 
burden on public funds.
Accumulation of assets vis-à-vis 
other countries generates revenues 
(e.g. dividends, interest income).
Capital inflow enables the establish-
ment of the infrastructure.
Credit-financed inflow of goods and 
services expands consumer oppor-
tunities.
A country that is heavily dependent 
on exports may be more vulnerable 
to global economic downturns. 
Assets may decline in value if trading 
partners’ currencies depreciate.
Persistent surpluses may trigger 
protectionist policies from trading 
partners.
Export revenues are insufficient to 
cover import costs, so a country must 
borrow from others to finance trade.
Unemployment rises as the country 
consumes more goods and services 
produced abroad than it produces 
domestically.
Lower tax revenue and higher public 
spending to finance unemployment 
increase debt. 
For Surplus 
Countries
Table 1: Consequences of Macroeconomic Imbalances
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an internal devaluation within its borders, giving German 
exporters a competitive advantage that its neighbors do not 
enjoy. 
European critics of Germany’s surplus contend that 
Europe’s largest economy exploits demand in neighboring 
countries that have trade and current account deficits, rather 
than stimulating greater domestic demand in Germany, 
increasing investment, and importing more. These critics 
argue that Germany thereby contributes to unemployment 
and increasing public debt in the Eurozone. One might 
argue that the German trade surpluses put the cohesion 
of the European Union at risk, which can only survive if all 
member states have, to some degree, an equal share in its 
benefits.6  
It is worth noting that the European Union has taken steps 
to mitigate the effects of macroeconomic imbalances and 
address their underlying causes within the bloc. The Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis that began in 2009 unraveled some 
imbalances that had accumulated in the first decade of the 
European Monetary Union, but exacerbated others. Capital 
moved away from risky assets, and the European banking 
sector deleveraged substantially. EU member states that 
had relied on external funding were hit hard as financing 
from abroad slowed to a halt. All of this led European 
leaders to rethink economic governance of the Union and 
to pay greater attention to internal imbalances. The so-
called Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) was 
introduced in 2011 as part of the European Semester, the 
bloc’s economic coordination framework. The MIP process 
is effectively an early warning system for imbalances that 
may pose a threat to the economic well-being of the EU, 
and involves screening for and monitoring of a wide range 
of indicators and policies that could create or perpetuate 
potentially harmful imbalances. 
Repercussions for Germany’s Surplus
While the European Commission and EU member states 
continue to ply Germany with rhetoric, U.S. President 
Donald Trump has begun to take actions to bring greater 
parity to the transatlantic economic relationship, which he 
continues to see as skewed in Europe’s favor. Mr. Trump has 
directed his criticism primarily toward Germany, with which 
the United States had a goods trade deficit of $64 billion in 
2017.7   The current U.S. administration has seemingly come 
to use goods trade as the primary measure of economic 
relations with other countries, and has consequently begun 
imposing tariffs on trading partners as a means of lowering 
the United States’ towering deficit. The European Union 
is an economic bloc with a single commercial policy and 
common external tariffs, however; targeting individual 
member states may not be as effective as the president 
might hope, or worse, may result in undesired spillover 
effects. As the Ifo Institute’s Gabriel Felbermayr points out, 
by way of example, the “EU is a customs and economic 
union in which individual member states are closely linked. 
The US surplus of almost $100 billion with the Netherlands 
is largely due to Germany…US internet giants access the 
German market via headquarters in the Netherlands for 
tax purposes, with a similar pattern seen in Ireland.”8   The 
European Union is a complex meshwork of national and 
supranational competencies and authority. While national 
governments have jurisdiction over some policy areas, 
such as taxation and investment, EU bodies control tariffs 
and other trade issues for all 28 member states. Within this 
context, actions that the U.S. president might take to counter 
the policies and practices of one member state will likely 
have impact outside that country’s borders, potentially 
affecting American business interests in other European 
countries as well. 
Beyond characterizing the volume of European, and 
specifically, German exports to the United States as 
unfair, the U.S. administration has yet to demonstrate how 
Germany’s surplus negatively affects the United States. While 
in theory the U.S. current account deficit may negatively 
affect employment, in real terms the unemployment rate 
is on par with Germany’s, at 3.9 percent. The deficit does 
add to the United States’ already substantial national debt, 
but here again, it cannot be attributed to any one country, 
and particularly not to any single member state of the 
economically integrated European Union. This is especially 
clear when one considers the current account balance – 
factoring in services trade and corporate profits – of the 
United States and the European Union alone, which in 2017 
gave the United States a surplus of $14 billion.9   
Trade policy is sometimes more about optics and politics than 
it is about economic reality. Following campaign promises 
to revive U.S. manufacturing sectors that have suffered 
as a result of globalization, President Trump has already 
imposed global import quotas and tariffs of 25 percent on 
steel and 10 percent on aluminum in the name of national 
security. In May 2018, just two months after the White 
House announced its metal tariffs, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce launched a similar investigation under section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to determine the 
national security implications of autos and auto parts, 
which industry sources say the president aims to complete 
before U.S. mid-term elections in November 2018.10   If 
implemented, these tariffs would disproportionately affect 
Germany, as cars and auto parts make up a significant 
share of its exports to the United States. 
The president himself has identified trade in goods balances 
as a primary determinant in his decision to impose punitive 
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tariffs against trading partners. As recently as June 18, 
2018, in a statement on China’s retaliation in response to 
tariffs levied against Chinese imports under section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974, Trump stated, 
This latest action by China clearly indicates its 
determination to keep the United States at a permanent 
and unfair disadvantage, which is reflected in our 
massive $376 billion trade imbalance in goods. This is 
unacceptable. Further action must be taken to encourage 
China to change its unfair practices, open its market to 
United States goods, and accept a more balanced trade 
relationship with the United States.11  
As indicated in Table 1 above, one disadvantage or 
potentially negative consequence of maintaining a current 
account or trade surplus is the likelihood of eliciting 
protectionist responses from trading partners. While U.S. 
administrations have criticized Germany’s imbalances 
since the early 2000s, President Trump has demonstrated 
willingness to use punitive tariffs to diminish the U.S. goods 
trade deficit – a mistakenly narrow measure of its deep 
and complex economic relationship with Germany and the 
broader European Union. 
In addition to this risk, another threat of Germany’s persistent 
current account surplus is the eventual loss of capital that 
fuels the country’s industrial base. The net outflow of capital 
associated with the surplus depresses domestic investment. 
Over time, this cornerstone of Germans’ high standard of 
living – a modern and effective stock of real capital – may 
be lost if no ready replacements are in place.12  
Germany’s current account surplus has measurable benefits 
for the German economy, workers, and firms, but may 
pose risks in the long term as well. Its impact on the rest 
of the world is complex, as it provides capital needed for 
investment in other countries, but also siphons demand from 
trading partners, thereby, in some cases, contributing to 
unemployment and public debt. The question of what can or 
should be done about Germany’s surplus is equally fraught, 
as advantageous results for one trading partner may be 
disadvantageous for another. In the end, appropriate 
treatment might come down to ideology, and the burden 
to change policies and practices may not be on countries 
in surplus – like Germany – but on those in deficit instead. 
Conclusions – What Can or Should Be 
Done About Imbalances?
Prevention and mitigation strategies for macroeconomic 
imbalances constitute an ideological minefield. Advocates 
of supply-driven economic policy – wherein government’s 
role is minimal and markets are expected to correct 
themselves through the forces of supply and demand 
– contend that government interventions to increase 
consumption, manipulate prices, or otherwise influence 
trade balances will reduce economic welfare. They argue 
that these interventions may lead to price distortions, 
ultimately preventing what rational economic operators 
would perceive to be the ideal production levels for goods 
and services. Proponents of supply-driven policy have 
faith in the functioning of markets, where customers and 
enterprises make rational decisions to ensure the optimal 
distribution of the productive resources available to society. 
According to this school of thought, if any action should 
be taken to mitigate macroeconomic imbalances, the onus 
should lie with the country in deficit. These countries should 
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limit consumption financed by loan, for example, which 
would require a reduction in public spending.13   
Proponents of demand-driven economic policy, on the 
other hand, are generally more skeptical of the automatic 
functioning of markets. Prices are rarely flexible in terms 
of downward adjustment, and, in many industrialized 
countries, wage cuts are often impracticable because of 
collective bargaining agreements and the social tension 
they might create. Furthermore, demand-driven economic 
policy posits that consumers and enterprises often do not 
act rationally. In this school of thought, the government has 
a role to play where the market fails, with a responsibility 
to increase a country’s economic welfare. Advocates 
of demand-driven economic policy favor a number of 
government measures to reduce trade imbalances, and 
place the burden of change primarily on countries with 
surplus, like Germany. 
So within this context, what can Germany and its trading 
partners do to correct these imbalances, if anything at 
all? Theoretically, automatic adjustment mechanisms 
related to exchange rates and the supply- and demand-
determined price of goods should even out macroeconomic 
imbalances. [See Annex for more information on 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms.] They have 
failed to do so in the case of Germany’s current account 
surplus. Because German domestic demand for goods is 
low, prices seldom rise significantly and inflation rates stay 
flat. The price mechanism, which would raise the price of 
goods that are in high demand and consequently reduce 
exports, is effectively disabled because of the country’s low 
demand – both for goods that might be imported and those 
it produces in excess. The exchange rate mechanism, which 
would raise the value of the surplus country’s currency as 
exports increase, is also ineffective in the context of the 
Eurozone, as discussed above. Since monetary policy is 
managed by the European Central Bank for all 19 national 
economies of the bloc, Germany enjoys a consistent de 
facto depreciation that makes its exports more attractive 
abroad and perpetuates its current account surplus. 
From a demand-driven economic policy perspective, 
Germany might first seek to increase its level of public 
investments, which include not only investment in the 
traditional sense of national accounts (i.e. buildings, streets, 
rail, power and water supply, and increasingly, digital 
infrastructure), but in the areas of education, research, 
development, and innovation, and a range of consumptive 
expenditures as well.14   Over the past several decades, U.S. 
officials have called on German governments to take such 
actions, with particular emphasis on spending in defense 
and security infrastructure. These investments might not only 
address the U.S.-Germany trade imbalance, but would 
have the add-on effect of helping Germany meet its NATO 
commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on security and 
defense. Germany has not met this threshold since the early 
1990s, and its budget projections through 2022 suggest it 
will continue to fall short.15   Meaningful outlays of public 
investment would send a cooperative, even if nominal, 
signal to the rest of the EU and other trading partners, with 
the added benefit of modernizing infrastructure, revitalizing 
educational resources, or catalyzing innovation.
Wage increases and pension reforms that encourage 
longer working lives might be effective means to scale 
back Germany’s current account surplus as well. Higher 
wages might increase domestic demand for goods and 
services, including both those produced within Germany 
and those imported from abroad. The government’s ability 
to intervene here is rather limited though, as private sector 
wages are set through a longstanding process of collective 
bargaining between employees, unions, and firms, and 
underwritten by government social policies that would be 
very difficult and unwise to unravel. In its capacity as an 
employer, the German government could increase wages 
in the public sector, but they would likely be insufficient 
to effect a meaningful shift in domestic demand, and by 
extension, Germany’s current account. 
A supply-driven economic policy position, on the other 
hand, would call for a different approach. To the extent 
that government intervention is warranted, countries 
with a current account deficit, such as the United States, 
would bear the burden of policy adjustment. Even so, 
supply-side economic policy proponents would offer 
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scant recommendations for Washington beyond reducing 
government consumption financed by foreign loans. 
Much of the United States’ current account deficit is tied 
to low saving rates among households and firms, so there 
is relatively little, beyond contracting expenditures, that 
the U.S. government can do in the near term to correct 
its imbalance. The Federal Reserve could raise interest 
rates to deter credit-financed consumption, but that would 
inevitably increase capital flows to the United States from 
abroad, which would in turn only give U.S. consumers more 
money to spend.
There is no simple solution or short-term fix for Germany’s 
sizable current account surplus. Its origins are diverse and, 
in some cases, beyond the direct control of the German 
government. Economists approaching the issue from 
different schools of thought disagree on the means to 
mitigate it, and even on whether it is a problem at all. It is 
clear, however, that the surplus is increasingly a source of 
contention between Germany and its economic partners, 
most notably other Eurozone countries and the United 
States. While Germany seems to have relatively few realistic 
near-term options for diminishing its surplus in a meaningful 
way, it might behoove its leaders to take some action, even 
if materially insufficient, to address this imbalance. 
This consideration is especially relevant now, as the cohesion 
of the European Union is tested on multiple fronts by Brexit 
and populist forces that explicitly call for a retreat from the 
European integration project, and by a U.S. president who is 
willing to break from decades of convention and diplomacy 
in pursuit of narrow, and at times misguided, aims. Although 
Germany’s surplus may be small in the grand context of 
the world economy, its persistence has undeniably become 
a global political issue. In this realm, economic theory – 
particularly when it is contested – may not be enough to 
quell the discontent of economic partners. Germany may 
face difficult decisions regarding its economic model in the 
coming years, and may need to enact creative solutions in 
order to remain a trusted trading partner both in and outside 
the European Union, and to maintain its quality of social 
and economic life. 
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Annex: Current Account Imbalances – An 
Overview
A country’s current account is a broad, comprehensive 
measure of its economic activity with the rest of the world, 
representing both cross-border trade in goods and services 
and primary and secondary income. Cross-border trade 
constitutes by far the greatest share of a country’s current 
account; thus, a current account surplus or deficit is almost 
invariably synonymous with a surplus or deficit in a 
country’s trade balance. Primary income consists of labor 
and investment income, including receipts and payments 
of worker compensation, as well as interest and dividend 
payments on investments and assets. Secondary income 
refers to one-way cross-border payments, or transfers made 
with no corresponding return of goods, services, or capital; 
examples of secondary income include transfers such as 
remittances and government payments of development aid. 
If the income a country generates by its exports and transfer 
payments is less than its expenses, that country has a current 
account deficit. If its income is greater than its expenditures, 
the country has a current account surplus. 
A country’s trade balance – the difference between exports 
and imports – is shaped in great part by domestic factors 
and, more significantly, by how they interact with similar 
factors in other countries. For example, the goods produced 
in a given country might enjoy a quality or price advantage 
relative to goods produced elsewhere. The higher quality or 
lower price of those goods makes them more competitive 
in the global market, increasing other countries’ demand 
for them as imports. Assuming that a country’s goods and 
services may be used domestically either for consumption 
or as investments, low domestic demand may also generate 
an excess available for sale abroad, feeding into an export 
surplus. These conditions are particularly characteristic of 
industrialized countries with high private and public saving 
rates. When companies and households save money in 
favor of consumption or investment, the excess goods and 
services that the country produces become available for net 
export. Similarly, low demand for domestic investment – 
resulting from domestic saturation or more favorable returns 
abroad – channels capital to foreign markets, thereby 
contributing to export surplus as well. 
When such conditions create or expand trade imbalances, 
various adjustment mechanisms – namely, exchange 
rate, price, and interest rate mechanisms – should kick 
in to realign trading partners’ accounts, according to 
textbook macroeconomic theory. (See Table 1) In practice, 
however, global imbalances remain persistent, as these 
mechanisms are often blocked by domestic policy decisions 
or economic conditions specific to a particular country 
or region. For example, the exchange rate mechanism, 
wherein a country’s currency should appreciate to correct 
an export surplus, is ineffective if that country pegs its 
currency to another or manipulates it in some other way. 
In the Eurozone, where 19 countries share a common 
currency governed by a single monetary policy, the 
exchange rate mechanism cannot mitigate imbalances 
caused by differences among member states’ economies, 
Figures US$ billions. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018
Figure 1: The ten countries with the largest current account surpluses or current account deficits in 2017
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manufacturing capacities, investment rules, and saving and 
consumption practices. The price mechanism may fail in 
a country with an import surplus because enterprises are 
unwilling or unable to sell their products at prices below 
production costs (assuming that domestic and foreign sale 
prices are the same). Moreover, wage cuts, which might be 
implemented to compensate for lost profits resulting from 
lower prices, are often unworkable on social grounds. In 
highly productive, industrialized countries that are prone to 
saturation (i.e. domestic production exceeds consumption), 
excess production capacity and relatively static demand 
render the mechanism’s impact on price nominal, despite 
strong export demand. Finally, the interest rate mechanism 
has lost effectiveness in recent years – particularly since the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 – as central banks 
have adopted policies that depress interest rates. Because 
banks maintain abundant liquidity, interest rates persistently 
do not respond to or reflect increasing global levels of debt. 
Macroeconomic imbalances have become a common 
feature of global trade relationships since the turn of the 
century. Many countries, including Germany, China, Japan, 
and the United States, have held their deficits or surpluses 
for decades. (See Figure 2) 
Figures in US$ billions. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018
Figure 2: Development of Current Account Balances, 1980-2017
Exchange 
Rate
The most impactful means of addressing 
an export surplus, the exchange rate 
mechanism raises the value of a country’s 
currency. This appreciation makes 
domestic products more expensive, 
lowering demand for them abroad.
Table 2: Three basic mechanisms should facilitate the 
automatic adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances.
Interest 
Rate
The interest rate mechanism applies to 
countries where imports exceed exports. 
If a country spends more on foreign trade 
than it earns, its debt rises and its credit 
rating goes down, resulting in a higher 
interest rate on trade financed by loan. 
Demand for imports decreases, as does, in 
an ideal case, excessive consumption.
Price
If a country’s exports exceed imports, 
demand for its goods and services is high. 
Higher demand leads to higher prices, 
which in turn should have a reverse effect 
on demand, as buyers in other countries 
seek alternatives at lower prices. In a 
country where imports exceed exports, the 
opposite should occur. 
